New evidence suggests that the human visual system incorporates a high-level, functionally specialised system for monitoring animals. Such a mechanism may have evolved to direct attention differentially to ancestrally important categories of objects, regardless of their current relevance.
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The ability to detect change in the visual environment is fundamental for human survival. Although in contemporary urban environments the most serious immediate risk to human health arises from inanimate cars and sports utility vehicles [1] , throughout much of human history it would have been imperative for our ancestors to monitor animate objects -both human and non-human animals. Both predators and prey took many different forms, and their proximity would be signaled by visual change. Under such circumstances the ability to monitor for, and rapidly detect, animate objects would confer a survival advantage. In a recent paper, New et al. [2] report evidence consistent with just such an adaptation in humans.
In their study, New et al. [2] were able to show that human observers are faster and more accurate at detecting change in animals than they are at detecting change in a variety of inanimate objects, ranging from plants and vehicles to buildings and tools. To measure change detection, they used the classic 'flicker' paradigm [3] , in which an original and modified scene alternate repeatedly, separated by a brief blank display, until observers find the change (Figure 1 ). The observers eventually found most changes, but they could take a very long time to do so, even for large changes, an impairment known as 'change blindness' [4] .
The authors assessed change detection using target objects drawn from five semantic categories, located within colour photographs of natural complex scenes. Changes to animals and people were detected more often and more quickly than changes to inanimate objects. Importantly, the advantage of animate over inanimate objects was present even for the fastest detections, and inanimate objects were also associated with a greater rate of 'change blindness', where a change was missed entirely. Animate objects were rated as more salient or 'interesting' by observers, raising the possibility that factors other than animacy might account for the findings, but their detection advantage persisted when salience was accounted for. This is consistent with a role for animacy over and above salience in explaining the advantage that animate objects enjoy in change monitoring, although the confounding of salience and animacy makes this conclusion not entirely secure.
Before concluding that this animate monitoring bias reflects an innate feature of the human visual system, two important potential confounds must be considered: the potential role of low-level differences in the images in change detection, and the possibility of expertise in detecting particular categories of object. Objects from different categories look different because they vary in the combination of low-level visual features from which they are made. For example, inanimate objects are frequently distinguished from animate by the presence of straight edges versus curved edges, respectively. But New et al. [2] showed that inverting the photographs used as stimuli (or blurring them) eliminated the animate monitoring bias. Inversion preserves lower-level stimulus properties but makes identifying the semantic category that a target object belongs to more difficult.
Alternatively, the animacy advantage for change detection might reflect particular expertise acquired by humans during development. Expertise can certainly affect change detection. For example, experts at American football are better than novices at spotting changes in football scenes [5] ; and drug users are more likely than non-drug users to detect changes to drug paraphernalia [6] . It is of course difficult to assess an individual's level of expertise with people and animals in general. To circumvent this problem, New et al. [2] used a control category that experimental subjects from California are undoubtedly highly familiar with -motor vehicles. A typical natural scene from Siesta Key, Florida, into which a change has been artificially introduced. Repeatedly alternating real and modified photographs but with a gray screen interposed between successive photographs leads to great difficulty in detecting the change that is obvious from inspecting the two static photographs. This inability to detect change is known as 'change blindness'. Example dynamic demonstrations of similar 'change blindness' movies can be found at the laboratory websites of Professor Daniel J. Simons (http://viscog.beckman.uiuc.edu/djs_lab/demos.html) and Ronald A. Rensink (http://www.psych.ubc.ca/wrensink/flicker/download/).
They found a change detection advantage for vehicles over other inanimate objects, consistent with an effect of expertise with this particular category; but critically there was no particular change detection advantage for vehicles over animals; and change detection performance for humans and non-human animals was equivalent. The authors argue that this is inconsistent with an expertise effect, as contemporary humans encounter other humans (and vehicles) far more often than non-human animals.
The neural basis of such an animate monitoring bias remains unclear. Although much of the human visual system can operate on information from many different domains, reflecting the fact that people can recognise a large number of different objects, some aspects of visual recognition appear to reflect the existence of content-specific, functionally specialised systems. For example, facial identity and facial expressions of emotion appear to be recognised in a content-specific fashion and are associated with activity in particular regions of visual cortex [7, 8] . But there is little evidence for regions in visual cortex that are strongly selective for animate or inanimate kinds generally [9] . The mapping between the psychological processes reflecting the animate monitoring bias and the underlying neural processes is therefore likely to be complex, as for other potentially heritable mental traits such as human kin detection [10] .
More generally, visual change detection in the 'flicker' paradigm is associated with activation not only of visual cortices but also areas of prefrontal and parietal cortex [11] , consistent with the proposal that attention plays a major role in change detection [3] . Indeed, New et al. [2] suggest that selective deployment of category-specific attention underpins the animacy monitoring bias. Here some caution is required, as although attention may be necessary for change detection it is not sufficient. For example, even directing attention to a person centrally placed in a visual scene is not sufficient to prevent change blindness [12] . Moreover, judgments of whether a scene contains an animal or not can proceed successfully in the near absence of directed (top-down) attention [13] . Thus, although differential allocation of attention may play an important role in animacy monitoring, it is not necessarily the only mechanism associated with the change detection advantage; nor do the findings clearly differentiate between top-down and bottom-up mechanisms of attentional capture.
Regardless of their precise neural basis, these new findings are consistent with the existence of mechanisms in the human brain that direct attention differentially to objects by virtue of their membership in ancestrally important categories, irrespective of their current utility. Darwinian evolutionary theory proposes that the phenotype of a creature is an adaptation to the particular demands of the ecological situation in which it evolved. To this extent, a phenotype displaying an animate monitoring bias is thus reflecting implicit information about the environment in which it evolved. The ability to preferentially detect change in animate objects allows humans to selectively engage in behaviours that aid survival when faced with those objects.
This suggests that the ability to detect change in animate objects represents a heritable trait that reflects implicit information about the external structure of the environment in which humans evolved, an intriguing possibility. But while intuitively appealing, caution is required before accepting such an argument. Jerry Fodor [14] has recently argued that phenotypes do not always represent implicit information about the environment in which they evolved. Instead, sometimes phenotypes simply reflect internal constraints on the functional organisation of that animal. For example, Fodor [14] suggests that the reason pigs do not have wings is less to do with the intrinsic structure of the environment that pigs inhabit, and more to do with the fundamentals of how the pig is constructed. The lack of wings does not by itself carry any intrinsic information about the pig's natural environment, and has not been selected against in the course of porcine history!
Regardless of the precise nature of the processes that have shaped the anatomy and functional specialisation of the brain, these new findings provide important insights into the organisation of the human visual system. Moreover, they emphasise how consideration of natural selection can potentially inform discovery of the psychological architecture of human cognition [15] .
